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Appendix A.1: INSTRUCTIONS (Horizontal Consensus Treatment) 
 
 
General Information: Welcome! You are about to participate in a social science experiment. 
Each of you received the same instruction sheet. 
 
Group: Each of you belongs to a group of three participants. No participant knows the identity 
of the two other members of his/her group.  
 
Roles: At the outset of the experiment, each participant is identified by a letter (A, B or C) when 
s/he is randomly assigned to a computer terminal. Each group consists of a participant A, a 
participant B and a participant C. Participants A and B can either agree to adopt a plan numbered 
0 to 10 or quit the experiment. C participants have no decision to take.  
 
Participants A and B have a 600 seconds delay (10 minutes) to reach an agreement on the plan 
to adopt. For this to happen, each participant A and B must make a plan proposal by clicking the 
plan’s number in the bottom row of the computer screen, and by validating the choice made. As 
soon as a participant (A or B) has validated his/her choice, the other participant (B or A) will be 
informed that a decision has been taken, but s/he will not be informed about the content of this 
decision. For the proposal to be displayed on the subjects’ screens, both participants must have 
submitted and validated their respective proposals. 
 
To each plan corresponds:  
1. a gain which is the same for participants A and  B, 
2. a gain for participant C which may represent a loss (a negative gain). 
 
Participants A, B and C know the gains associated to each plan.  
 
 If the plan proposals are not identical, there is no agreement between participant A and B 
and each can submit a new proposal. 
 
 If the proposals are identical, an agreement is possible. Each participant can then either 
confirm that an agreement has been reached by clicking the “Confirm” button, or reject the 
agreement by clicking the “Cancel” button.  
o If both A and B choose “Confirm”, then the proposed plan is adopted and the 
corresponding gains are distributed to participants A, B and C. The experiment is then finished. 
o If A or B chooses to reject the agreement, then both can then submit a new plan 
proposal. 
 
At any time during the 600 seconds of play, each participant (A or B) can quit the experiment 
either by clicking the “Quit” button, or by clicking the “Stop the experiment and quit”. In either 
case, the experiment stops and the gains are equal to zero for the three participants A, B and C. 
The computer displays the proposal of participant A in dark blue and that of participant B in dark 
red. The next-to-last proposals of A and B appear light blue and light red, respectively.  
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The experiment continues as long as the 600 seconds time delay has not been reached or as long 
as no participant chooses to quit. If no agreement has been reached within this time delay, the 
experiments ends and the gains of the three participants A, B and C are equal to zero. 
 
At any time during the experiment, the time left to agree on a plan is displayed in the upper left 
corner of the computer screen. The count-down starts as soon as the first propositions of A and B 
are displayed on their respective computer screens.  
 
Participant C has no decision to take and does not know the proposals made participants A and 
B. S/he is only asked to answer the questions that appear on his/her computer screen. Answering 
these questions has no effect on gains or on the experiment’s results.  
 
 
Communication (only in treatment « with Communication »): Participants A and B can choose to 
verbally communicate through an electronic mail system. To do so, one has to write a message in the 
appropriate space and send it. Each participant A and B can shut the electronic mail system down, and 
each participant can re-open it after having shut it down. When the electronic mail system is shut down, 
participants A and B cannot communicate.  
 
You are not allowed to use the electronic mail system to send insulting messages, or messages that 
identify you (name, surname or nickname) or which help to identify you (age, ethnic origin, religion, 
profession, etc.). 
 
Total Gain: The gains associated to each plan are expressed in Euros (€). At the outset of the 
experiment, each of you will receive a capital balance of 7 Euros. Your total reward from this 
experiment will be equal to 7 Euros plus the gain made in this experiment or to 7 Euros minus 
the loss made in this experiment.  
 
Questionnaire: Before starting the experiment, and once assigned to a computer terminal, we 
will ask you to answer a questionnaire about these instructions. Answering this questionnaire 
does not interfere with the experiment.  
 
If you have a question, ask one of the administrators in the laboratory, not another participant. In 
this experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE (Horizontal Consensus Treatment)  
(only displayed on subjects’ screens) 
 
1. Among the participants to this experiment, there only are participants A and B. 
Answer: Wrong. There are as many participants C as there are participants A (and B). 
 
2. In each group of three participants, participant A can only propose a plan to participant B. 
Answer: Wrong. Participant A can either propose a plan numbered 0 to 10 or « quit »    
the experiment. 
 
3. If participants A and B propose the same plan, then this plan will be adopted only if both 
confirm their agreement.  
Answer: Right.  
 
4. Participant A or B may choose to quit the experiment at anytime s/he wishes. 
Answer: Right.  
 
5. If participants A and B did not reach an agreement for a plan within the allotted time, then 
the plan implemented by default is the last plan proposed by A. 
Answer: Wrong. If participants A and B did not reach an agreement within the allotted 
time, then the plan implemented by default is “Quit”.   
 
6. Participant A or B may propose the same plan several times in a row. 
Answer: Right. 
 
7. If participant A or B chooses to quit the experiment, by choosing the « Quit » option, then 
the adopted plan is « Quit ». 
Answer: Right. 
 
8. If participant A or B chooses to quit, then participants A, B and C get zero profits.  
Answer: Right.  
 
9. For a given plan, participants A, B and C always make the same profit. 
Answer: Wrong. For a given plan, Participants A and B make the same profit. 
Participant C makes either a gain or a loss (a negative gain). 
 
10. Your total gain from this experiment is equal to your €7 capital minus the gains realized 
during the experiment. 
Answer: Wrong. Your total gain from this experiment is equal to your €7 capital plus the 
gains realized during the experiment or to your €7 capital minus the losses realized 
during the experiment. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
7*. Only participants A and B can communicate via an electronic mail system.  
Answer: Right.       [HcowC treatment]  
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Appendix A.2: INSTRUCTIONS (Vertical Treatment) 
 
 
General Information: Welcome! You are about to participate in a social science experiment. 
Each of you received the same instruction sheet. 
 
Group: Each of you belongs to a group of three participants. No participant knows the identity 
of the two other members of his/her group.  
 
Roles: At the outset of the experiment, each participant is identified by a letter (A, B or C) when 
s/he is randomly assigned to a computer terminal. Each group consists of a participant A, a 
participant B and a participant C.  
 
Participant A has two options. S/he can:  
 
1) Propose participant B to adopt a plan numbered 0 to 10 by clicking the plan’s number in 
the bottom row of the computer screen, and by validating the choice made.  
      To each plan corresponds:  
• a gain which is the same for participants A and  B, 
• a gain for participant C which may represent a loss (a negative gain). 
 
Or 
 
2) Quit the experiment by clicking the “Quit” button and by validating the choice made. In 
this case, the experiment ends and the gains are equal to zero for the three participants A, B and 
C.  
 
Participant B has two options. S/he can:  
 
1) Accept the plan proposed by participant A by clicking the “Accept” button. In this case, 
the plan is implemented, the experiment ends and the corresponding gains are distributed to 
participants A, B and C.  
 
Or 
 
2) Quit the experiment by clicking the “Quit” button and by validating the choice made. In 
this case, the experiment ends and the gains are equal to zero for the three participants A, B and 
C.  
 
Participant C has no decision to take and does not know the proposals made participants A and 
B. S/he is only asked to answer the questions that appear on his/her computer screen. Answering 
these questions has no effect on gains or on the experiment’s results.  
 
Participants A, B and C know the gains associated to each plan.  
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Communication (only in treatment « with Communication »): Participants A and B can choose to 
verbally communicate through an electronic mail system. To do so, one has to write a message in the 
appropriate space and send it. Each participant A and B can shut the electronic mail system down, and 
each participant can re-open it after having shut it down. When the electronic mail system is shut down, 
participants A and B cannot communicate.  
 
You are not allowed to use the electronic mail system to send insulting messages, or messages that 
identify you (name, surname or nickname) or which help to identify you (age, ethnic origin, religion, 
profession, etc.). 
 
Total Gain: The gains associated to each plan are expressed in Euros (€). At the outset of the 
experiment, each of you will receive a capital balance of 7 Euros. Your total reward from this 
experiment will be equal to 7 Euros plus the gain made in this experiment or to 7 Euros minus 
the loss made in this experiment.  
 
Questionnaire: Before starting the experiment, and once assigned to a computer terminal, we 
will ask you to answer a questionnaire about these instructions. Answering this questionnaire 
does not interfere with the experiment.  
 
If you have a question, ask one of the administrators in the laboratory, not another participant. In 
this experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE (Vertical treatment)  
(only displayed on subjects’ screens) 
 
1. Among the participants to this experiment, there only are participants A and B. 
Answer: Wrong. There are as many participants C as there are participants A (and B). 
 
2. In each group of three participants, participant A can only propose a plan to participant B. 
Answer: Wrong. Participant A can either propose a plan numbered 0 to 10 or « quit »    
the experiment. 
 
3. Participant B may reject A’s proposal by choosing the “quit” option. 
Answer: Right.  
 
4. Participant C may reject A’s proposal by choosing the « quit » option. 
Answer: Wrong. Only participant B can reject A’s plan.  
 
5. If participant B chooses to quit, then the plan adopted by default is plan 0. 
Answer: Wrong. If participant B chooses to quit, then no plan is implemented and the 
game ends. 
 
6. If participant B accepts A’s proposal, then this plan proposal will be implemented. 
Answer: Right. 
 
7. If participant A chooses the « Quit » option, then the adopted plan is « Quit ». 
Answer: Right. 
 
8. If participant A or B chooses to quit, then participants A, B and C get zero profits.  
Answer: Right.  
 
9. For a given plan, participants A, B and C always make the same profit. 
Answer: Wrong. For a given plan, Participants A and B make the same profit. 
Participant C makes either a gain or a loss (a negative gain). 
 
10. Your total gain from this experiment is equal to your €7 capital minus the gains realized 
during the experiment. 
Answer: Wrong. Your total gain from this experiment is equal to your  €7 capital plus the 
gains realized during the experiment or to your €7 capital minus the losses realized 
during the experiment. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
7*. Only participants A and B can communicate via an electronic mail system.  
Answer: Right.       [VwC treatment]  
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Appendix A.3: INSTRUCTIONS (Horizontal Average Treatment) 
 
 
General Information: Welcome! You are about to participate in a social science experiment. 
Each of you received the same instruction sheet. 
 
Group: Each of you belongs to a group of three participants. No participant knows the identity 
of the two other members of his/her group.  
 
Roles: At the outset of the experiment, each participant is identified by a letter (A, B or C) when 
s/he is randomly assigned to a computer terminal. Each group consists of a participant A, a 
participant B and a participant C. Participants A and B can either propose a plan numbered 0 to 
10 or quit the experiment. C participants have no decision to take.  
 
Participants A and B have a 600 seconds delay (10 minutes) to make a plan proposal by 
clicking the plan’s number in the bottom row of the computer screen, and by validating the 
choice made.   
 
To each plan corresponds:  
3. a gain which is the same for participants A and  B, 
4. a gain for participant C which may represent a loss (a negative gain). 
 
Participants A, B and C know the gains associated to each plan.  
 
During the 600 seconds of play, each participant (A or B) can quit the experiment by clicking the 
“Quit” button. In this case, the experiment stops and the gains are equal to zero for the three 
participants A, B and C. 
 
If none of the participants chooses to Quit, and as soon as participants A and B validated their 
choice, the gains of A, B and C are displayed on subjects’ monitors; these gains are equal to the 
average of the gains (or losses) associated to A and B’s chosen plans. 
 
Each of participants A and B then can either: 
 
 Accept this distribution of gains by clicking the « Accept » button, 
Or 
 Refuse this distribution of gains by clicking the « Quit » button.     
 
If both A and B accept, then participants A and B each receive the average of the gains 
associated to their proposals, and participant C receives the average of the gains (or losses) 
associated to these plans. The experiment is then finished. 
 
If either A or B quits, then the gains are equal to zero for the three participants A, B and C. The 
experiment is then finished.   
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If either A or B has not made a proposal or has not decided whether to accept or not the proposed 
distribution of gains within the 600 seconds, then the experiments ends and the gains of 
participants A, B and C are equal to zero. A count-down will display on A and B’s monitor 
screens the remaining time. 
 
Participant C has no decision to take and does not know the proposals made by participants A 
and B. S/he is only asked to answer the questions that appear on his/her computer screen. 
Answering these questions has no effect on gains or on the experiment’s results.  
 
Communication (only in treatment « with Communication »): Participants A and B can choose to 
verbally communicate through an electronic mail system. To do so, one has to write a message in the 
appropriate space and send it. Each participant A and B can shut the electronic mail system down, and 
each participant can re-open it after having shut it down. When the electronic mail system is shut down, 
participants A and B cannot communicate.  
 
You are not allowed to use the electronic mail system to send insulting messages, or messages that 
identify you (name, surname or nickname) or which help to identify you (age, ethnic origin, religion, 
profession, etc.). 
 
Total Gain: The gains associated to each plan are expressed in Euros (€). At the outset of the 
experiment, each of you will receive a capital balance of 7 Euros. Your total reward from this 
experiment will be equal to 7 Euros plus the gain made in this experiment or to 7 Euros minus 
the loss made in this experiment.  
 
Questionnaire: Before starting the experiment, and once assigned to a computer terminal, we 
will ask you to answer a questionnaire about these instructions. Answering this questionnaire 
does not interfere with the experiment.  
 
If you have a question, ask one of the administrators in the laboratory, not another participant. In 
this experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE (Horizontal Average Treatment)  
(only displayed on subjects’ screens) 
 
1. Among the participants to this experiment, there only are participants A and B. 
Answer: Wrong. There are as many participants C as there are participants A (and B). 
 
2. In each group of three participants, participant A can only propose a plan to participant B. 
Answer: Wrong. Participant A can either propose a plan numbered 0 to 10 or « Quit »    
the experiment. 
 
3. If participants A and B propose plans with numbers between 0 and 10, then they will each 
receive the average of the gains associated to these plans only if they both accept this 
distribution of gains. 
Answer: Right.  
 
4. Participant A or B may choose to quit the experiment at anytime s/he wishes. 
Answer: Right.  
 
5. If participant A or B has either not made a plan proposal or not accepted the distribution of 
gains within the allotted time, then the plan adopted by default is the plan proposed by A. 
Answer: Wrong. If participant A or B has not made a proposal nor taken a decision 
within the allotted time, then the plan implemented by default is “Quit”. 
 
6. Participant A or B may propose the same plan several times in a row. 
Answer: Wrong. Participant A or B can make only one plan proposal.   
 
7. If participant A chooses the « Quit » option, then the adopted plan is « Quit ». 
Answer: Right. 
 
8. If participant A or B chooses to quit, then participants A, B and C get zero profits.  
Answer: Right.  
 
9. For a given plan, participants A, B and C always make the same profit. 
Answer: Wrong. For a given plan, Participants A and B make the same profit. 
Participant C makes either a gain or a loss (a negative gain). 
 
10. Your total gain from this experiment is equal to your €7 capital minus the gains realized 
during the experiment. 
Answer: Wrong. Your total gain from this experiment is equal to your €7 capital plus the 
gains realized during the experiment or to your €7 capital minus the losses realized 
during the experiment. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
7*. Only participants A and B can communicate via an electronic mail system.  
Answer: Right.       [HavwC treatment]  
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Appendix B.1: Screenshots (Hco and HcowC) 
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Appendix B.2: Screenshots (Hav and HavwC) 
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Appendix B.3: Screenshots (V and VwC) 
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Appendix C: Consequentialist preference approaches and example with 
responsibility-alleviation 
 
 
Even when expanded to allow for altruism or to capture fairness concerns, simple game-theoretic 
models do not provide straightforward predictions of how the process for decision-making 
should affect ethical outcomes. As shown above (Conjecture 0), preference heterogeneity is vital 
for any effects to exist. Here, we study the possibility of threats and signaling within the above 
impure utilitarian model; by consequentialism, r=1 and wA and wB are independent of structure 
and communication. Notice that for 7y ≤ , 1w β β= −  captures Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt’s 
(1999) model of fairness with β  as the aversion to self-advantageous inequality and 1 2β >
implies w >1.1
Recall that each actor’s preferred outcome as a function of w is 
  
{ 5/12}( ) 6. wy w >= Ι  where I is a 0/1 
indicator function; so A and B’s preferences conflict when their altruism parameters ( ,A Bw w ) lie 
on either side of 5/12. In a vertical firm, A makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to B that 
maximizes A’s utility given A’s beliefs about B’s preference parameter Bw .2 In a horizontal 
firm, there are many equilibria, but the following class of equilibria always exist and are 
attractively simple: A and B coordinate on a protocol in which, at random, either A or B makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the other.3
                                                 
1 In our simple setting the related models of Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), Gary Charness and Matthew 
Rabin (2002), and James Cox, Daniel Friedman, and Steve Gjerstad (2007) generate similar predictions. 
 The resulting equilibria replicate the equilibria in the 
vertical treatments, except that A and B’s roles may be reversed. Given the random assignment 
of roles and treatments, this implies a common distribution of payoff outcomes for V and Hco 
and for VwC and HcowC. This reinforces Conjecture 0, but the equilibrium assumption is 
implausibly strong; for instance, preference signaling is likely in Hco and impossible in V. 
Nonetheless, predicting a specific treatment effect requires strong distributional and equilibrium 
assumptions. 
2 A may raise y above ( )Ay w  to reduce expected quits. B prefers to acquiesce (not quit) if 
( ) where ( ) 20(6 5) /(12 5)B B B By y w y w w w≥   = − − . If A knew B’s preference type, A would set 
{ }Max ( ), ( )A By y w y w= . (For 5 / 6Bw < , ( ) 0By w <  so A faces no credible threat of a quit.) 
3 A first round proposal game can serve to coordinate which insider has the take-it-or-leave-it power. As noted by a 
referee, consistent with this take-it-or-leave-it idea, many decisions in our data do end up implementing one of the 
two insider’s initial proposals.  
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Predicting the impact of communication also requires strong assumptions, but we can offer an 
example where cheap-talk has a negative impact on vertical structures: 
Suppose that for all subjects and hence for A and B (independently), 1w =  with probability p  
and 0w =  with probability 1 p− . In V and VwC, if 1Aw = , then 6y =  since B can never 
pressure A to reduce y . Now restrict attention to the contingency with 0Aw = . First, suppose p  
is low ( 1/ 5p < ). In V, A sets 0y = . In VwC, A would set y = 0 if B types pool. The low type 
subordinate (B with 0Bw = ) cannot gain from any deviation, so it is “self-signaling” for the high 
type (B with 1Bw = ) to threaten to quit since y = 0 < (1) 10 / 7y = . Our setting permits “rich-
language” communication (see Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin 1996), so we predict the 
separating equilibrium in which A (restricted to integer values) sets 2y =  when B’s type is high 
and y = 0 otherwise. The average y is then higher in VwC than in V, but in V, the high type B 
ends up quitting,  so C’s average payoff is actually lower in VwC.4 p   Second, suppose  is high  
( 1/ 5p > ). A with 0Aw =  sets 2y =  in V (where pooling is unavoidable). In VwC, a self-
signaling separation message, now from the low type subordinate, lowers y  from 2 to 0. There 
are no quits, so C’s average payoff is again lower in VwC relative to V. In sum, for this example, 
communication makes vertical firms behave less sociably. 
The opposite effect is possible in the more extreme case where the high type has w > 5/4. It is 
still true that when p is high, communication hurts C; type separation reduces the need for an 
unkind boss A to set a precautionary kind strategy. However, when p is low, the unkind boss is 
not cautious and separation of kind subordinates with w > 5/4 leads to outcomes with y > 5 
which are kinder to C than the above quits. So VwC is kinder than V in this admittedly extreme 
case.  
 
                                                 
4 C’s average payoff (for A with 0Aw = ) is (1 )( 6) ( 3.6)p p− − + −   in VwC and (1 )( 6) (0)p p− − +  in V; insider 
foregone payoffs are also lower in VwC than V (conditional averages are p and 5p, respectively). 
 
 
15 
Responsibility-alleviation: an example where C is worse off in V than in Hco 
 
Suppose w = 0 or 1 with equal probability ½ (for all actors) and suppose perceived 
responsibilities ( ) 0Br V = , ( ) ( ) 0.9B Aco cor H r H= = , ( ) 1Ar V = . Consider the equilibrium of Hco in 
which one of A and B (probability ½ for each) makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the other. 
If initial interactions allow A and B to signal their types (see above), the average value of y is  = 
½(6) + ¼(2+0) = 3.5, because y = 6 when the proposer has w = 1 (probability ½), y = 2 when the 
proposer has w = 0 and the responder has w = 1 (probability ¼) and y = 0 if both proposer and 
responder have w = 0 (probability ¼). In the (less plausible) case of a pooling equilibrium,  = 
½(6) + ½(2) = 4, because a proposer with w = 0 sets y = 2 when uninformed about the 
responder’s type. By contrast in V, when wA = 0, A sets y = 0 (rather than y = 2) even if A knows 
wB = 1, since B does not feel responsible in V (rB = 0 implies wB.rB = 0). So the expected outcome 
in V is lower at    = 3 (=½(6)) and C is worse off (there are no quits). 
 
Voice-as-involvement: two examples where C is better off in VwC than in V 
 
The first is as close as possible to the responsibility-alleviation example just above. The second 
demonstrates the important effect of categorical ethics. 
 
1) Using the parameter constellation of the previous example, but adding rA(VwC) = 1 and 
substituting rB(VwC) = 0.9 in place of the assumption for Hco, provides a simple example of 
voice-as-involvement. The equilibrium derivation is very similar. In V, the average value of y is 
3, exactly as above. In the pooling equilibrium of VwC, A sets y = 6 when wA = 1 but when wA = 
0, A now sets y = 2 as a precaution against the (probability 0.5) risk that wB = 1. So the average 
of y,   = 4. In the separating equilibrium of VwC (the most plausible by the reasoning on 
previous page), y = 6 when wA = 1, y = 0 when wA = wB = 0 and y = 2 when wA = 0 and wB = 1. 
So on average,  = 3.5. Either way, C is better off in VwC than in V. 
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2) Suppose that a fraction q of actors obey the rule “do not participate in a project that does harm 
if able to exert some influence on the level of harm”. For concreteness, we suppose these ethical 
actors are utilitarian, preferring to set y = 6, while other actors are self-interested. We can 
represent the ethical types as actors with w = ½ for whom r = 1 if the rule applies and r = 0 if 
not; in particular, in the subordinate role, they have rB = 0 in V but rB = 1 in VwC. So in V, y = 6 
with probability q and otherwise y = 0. In the separating equilibrium of VwC, y = 6 with 
probability q,  y = 5 with probability q(1-q) and y = 0 with probability (1-q)2. Clearly, C’s 
average payoff is then higher in VwC than in V. In the (less plausible) pooling equilibrium of 
VwC, C’s average payoff is either the same as in the separating equilibrium (for q < ½, the y = 5 
outcome is replaced by a quit) or it is even higher (by 6(1-q)2 for q ≥ ½, as y = 5 substitutes the y 
= 0 outcome). Either way, C is better off in VwC than in V. 
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Appendix D: Analysis in terms of Harmful vs. Harmless plans  
 
We report here on another measure of ‘kindness’ to C which simply distinguishes harmful 
outcomes (plans with y < 5,  corresponding to foregone payoffs < 2.5 in Figure 2) from harmless 
outcomes (y ≥ 5  or non-production, denoted “Quit”, i.e., foregone payoffs ≥ 2.5). The table 
below reports the frequencies of harmful and harmless plans and the outcomes of two-tailed 
binomial tests that check if in a given treatment harmful and harmless plans are equally likely or 
not. 
 
Treatment Harmful Harmless Binomial test 
(p-value) 
Hco 17 3 .0026 
Hav 17 3 .0026 
V 16 4 .0118 
HcowC 18 2 .0004 
HavwC 14 6 .1153 
VwC 11 9 .8238 
 
Conjecture / Observation 0: Two-tailed binomial tests reject the null hypothesis that harmful 
and harmless outcomes are equally likely in Hco, Hav, V and HcowC (p-values  ≤ .012) but do not 
reject in HavwC (p = .115) nor in VwC (p = .824). Two-tailed Fisher 2×2 exact tests find a 
significant difference in the likelihoods of observing harmful and harmless plans between VwC 
and Hco and between VwC and Hav (both p-values = .082). 
Conjecture / Observation 1: One-tailed binomial tests reject the null that harmful and harmless 
outcomes are equally likely in favor of the alternative that they are more likely to be harmful in 
V (p = .006). This is not the case for VwC (p = .412). Also plans are more likely to be harmful in 
V than in VwC according to a one-tailed 2×2 Fisher exact test (p = .088). 
Conjecture / Observation 2: One-tailed binomial tests reject the null of equivalence in favor of 
the alternative that plans are more likely to be harmful in Hco, Hav and V (p = .001, p = .001 and 
p = .006, respectively). One-tailed Fisher 2x2 exact tests do not pick up the predicted differences 
since we cannot reject the null of equal likelihoods between Hco and Hav nor between Hav and V 
(both p-values = 1.000). We attribute this to the fact that Hav leads to a centrally concentrated 
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distribution and the middle values, foregoing 1.5 and 2, still involve harm, so they are lumped 
with the least kind plan 0, foregoing 0. 
Conjecture / Observation 4: One-tailed binomial tests reject the null that harmful and harmless 
outcomes are equally likely in favor of the alternative that they are more likely to be harmful in 
HcowC (p = .0002). This is not the case for VwC (p = .412). A one-tailed Fisher 2×2 exact test 
confirms that HcowC is significantly more likely than VwC to generate harmful outcomes (both 
p-values = .015). 
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Appendix E.1: Literal transcripts of Chat log files in HcowC 
    
Group id and chat data 
Foregone 
Payoff 
[Plan #] 
(# rounds) 
HcowC, Group 1:  
-A: >should it be a plan such that the payoffs are the same for all? 
-A: >or the one that makes us earn most? 
-B: >doesn’t matter if he earns less 
-A: >so we choose plan 0 
-A: >or 2 as you’ve put ? 
-B: >i think so too, even if that’s not very nice for him 
-A: >we choose 0 then? 
-B: >yes 
-A: >ok 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(2 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 2 (no communication) 0 
[Plan 0] 
(1 round) 
HcowC, Group 3:  
-B: >if I have 5 and you 5, we earn 5 euros? 
-B: >? 
-B: >0 
-B: >are you there 
-A: >yes but that’s not nice for the person ’cause he came as we did 
-B: >so we can do this 
-A: >what 
-B: >5 euros each and we divide the gains in three 
-B: >that’s better than 2 2 and 1.2 
-B: >3.3! 
-A: >yes but we don’t know who is C 
-B: >in any case he cannot decide 
-A: >that’s true 
-B: >he has the choice between -6 and 1.2 
-B: >1.2 is not much! 
-B: >instead of having 1.2, he’ll have 0 
-B: >so are you ok with this 
-A: >no he won’t have 0, he’ll have 6 instead of the starting 7 
-B: >it’s better than 0 
-B: >you don’t know him at all 
-B: >and if it happens that you know him 
-B: >then we divide in three 
-A: >i don’t know 
-B: >there are 280 seconds left 
-B: >5 each 
-A: >5 minutes 
-B: >:) 
-A: >it’s a matter of conscience 
-B: >and too bad for him that he chose to be C 
-A: >poor him, he hasn’t chosen 
-B: >destiny 
-B: >which makes that we are here 
-B: >5 is better than 2 no                                                                                [Continued Overleaf] 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(2 rounds) 
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-B: >ok 
-A: >what a difference!!! lol [= lots of laughs]                                               
-B: >3 euros difference                                                                                    
-B: >for each plan                                                                                            
-B: >that makes 30 euros at the end of the experiment                                   
-B: >each 
-B: >person                                                                                                      
-B: >A and B 
-B: >2 minutes left 
-A: >so well we are going to do it because otherwise we will not agree 
-B: >1 minute 
-B: >ok 
-B: >gone 
HcowC, Group 4:  
-B: > Hello you have already chosen? 
-A: >hi! I think that the best solution is to maximize our gains 
-A: >yes 
-B: >completely agree, i do 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(2 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 5:  
-B: >do you understand something? 
-A: >yes 
-B: >do i choose a number at random? 
-A: >if you are naughty you don’t care about C 
-B: >ok 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(1 round) 
HcowC, Group 6:  
-B: >don’t you think that it’s not very nice to make C lose 4.8 euros? 
-A: >yeah that’s true 
1 
[Plan 2] 
(2 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 7:  
-B: >1 and we don’t talk anymore 
1 
[Plan 2] 
(7 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 8 (no communication) 0.5 
[Plan 1] 
(2 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 9:  
-A: >what do you think, do we validate? 
-B: >well that’s what is best for us 
-A: >i agree, i confirm 
-B: >me too, i confirmed 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(1 round) 
HcowC, Group 10:  
-B: >you’re too tough with C who’s with us 
-B: >I suggest a choice between 3 et 5 and not smaller 
-A: >you’re right 
-B: >so 3 4 or 5 
-A: >I suggest 4 
-A: >is that ok with you? 
-B: >if you want but we’re ripping him off... if I were him I would be disappointed 
-A: >i would be disappointed too 
-B: >So what do we do? 
-A: >in fact you’re right, the three of us earn more with 5 than with 4 
-A: >so better 5 
-B: >Nice computation... the total is indeed bigger... 
-A: >thanks...but it’s only 20 cents 
-B: >Still... 
-A: >So do we agree for the 5?                                                                       [Continued Overleaf] 
2.5 
[Plan 5] 
(4 rounds) 
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-B: >Did you calculate the other cases? 
-A: >yes it’s the best 
-B: >then it’s fine with me 
-A: >ok                                                                                                            
HcowC, Group 11:  
-A: >do we agree for plan 0? 
-B: >ok 
-B: >that’s not nice for C 
-A: >that’s not nice for C 
-B: >lol 
-B: >I confirmed 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(2 rounds) 
 
 
HcowC, Group 12:  
-A: >plan 1, ok? 
-A: >plan 0 sorry!                                                                                            
-B: >ok 
-A: >ok 
-A: >not the 0 !! must be better! 
-A: >so? 
-B: >i think that player C loses everything no? 
-B: >but for me it’s ok 
-A: >nope i think he earns €1 !!! 
-A: >ok for the 0??? 
-B: >ok 
-A: >cool! 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(2 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 13 (no communication) 0 
[Plan 0] 
(5 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 14:  
-A: >that means that C has nothing 
1.5 
[Plan 3] 
(4 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 15:  
-A: >1 
-B: >3 
-A: >ok 
-B: >what ok 
-A: >i suggest 3 TOO 
1.5 
[Plan 3] 
(2 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 16:  
-A: >I think we must choose the strategy 0 to maximise our gains 
-B: >i completely agree! 
0 
[Plan 0] 
(1 round) 
HcowC, Group 17:  
-A: >hi B  
-B: >Hi A ;)  
-A: >:) 
-B: >so what do we do?  
-A: >well i don’t know  
-A: >do you think C’s nice?  
-B: >no idea : ))))))))  
-A: >number 3?  
-B: >why?  
-A: >well no idea :)  
-B: >i propose the following  
-B: >either we pick the extreme  
-B: >No. 0 
-A: >ok                                                                                                            [Continued Overleaf] 
3 
[Plan 6] 
(1 round) 
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-A: >but that isn’t nice  
-B: >or the other extreme, 6  
-A: >why 6?  
-B: >from 6 onwards he’ll only get 1.2  
-B: >and we get less than 2 Euros  
-A: >in any case less than 5 wouldn’t be nice 
-B: >yes, ok 
-A: >if not, 5                                                                                                    
-B: >C 0?  
-A: >yeah  
-A: >so 5 or 6  
-B: >ok, let’s go for 6 
-A: > ok, let’s do it 
-B: >ok? 
-A: >we validate for 6?  
-B: >yes, plan 6  
-A: >ok 
-B: >and then at the end of the experiment we present ourselves to each other?  
-B: >and we look for our C?  
-A: >if you want but i’m in a hurry!  
-A: >start by answering                                                                                   
-B: >me too :)))  
-A: >confirm plan 6!  
-B: >i did so, done!   
-B: >ok 
HcowC, Group 18 (no communication) 0 
[Plan 0] 
(1 round) 
HcowC, Group 19:  
-B: >plan 1  
-A: >hi with this plan we can earn the most, do you agree? :)  
-B: >yes that’s 4.5 each  
-A: >well, ok, plan 1 then :)  
-B: >ahh no wait  
-B: >it’s 0 i didn’t see it  
-B: >sorry  
0 
[Plan 0] 
(3 rounds) 
HcowC, Group 20:  
-A: >go 
-B: >ok 
-B: >plan zero?  
-A: >why?  
-B: >well, that’s where we earn most….  
-A: >ah yes i didn’t see it  
-B: >you’re turn to validate ;)  
0 
[Plan 0] 
(1 round) 
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Appendix E.2: Literal transcripts of Chat log files in HavwC 
 
Group id and chat data 
Foregone 
Payoff 
[Plan #’s] 
HavwC, Group 1:  
-B: >hello  
-A: >hello  
-B: >plan 0 seems to me the most obvious, don’t you think?  
-B: >we both earn 5  
-A: >yes  
-B: >poor C…!  
-A: >hahaha^^  
-B: >shall we choose immediately?  
-A: >yes unless you still want to think it over  
-B: >not really … it’s pretty clear!  
-A: >ok!  
-B: >ok, it’s done  
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
 
 
HavwC, Group 2:  
-A: > what type of proposition do you plan on taking? plan 0?  
-B: >yes  
-B: >i’m choosing 0  
-A: >no scruples over C  
-A: >ok  
-B: >no none at all, if he were you he would have done the same  
-A: >LOL  
-A: >that’s clear  
-A: >well then let’s validate!  
-B: >let’s do it 
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
 
HavwC, Group 3 (no communication) 0 
[Plans 0,0] 
HavwC, Group 4:  
-A: >we are going to choose the plan that maximizes the gains of all players of our group  
-A: >but for this one should accept a plan rather equitable for all three of us  
-A: >me and you won’t be able to maximize our profits  
-A: >what do you think about this?  
-A: >on the other hand, we’ll have maximized the gains of all three of us  
-A: >thus I choose plan 6  
-A: >what do you think about this?   
-A: >anyway, we’ve got to agree on a plan if we want to earn money  
2.5 
[Plans 4,6] 
HavwC, Group 5:  
-A: >What are you thinking of doing for c?  
-A: > Personally i was considering plan 7 or at worst 5 but the other plans are really mean  
-A: >??? 
-A: >actually plan 6 - plan 7 is stupid lol  
-A: >hello?                                                                                                      
-B: >I thought that everyone gets the average  
-A: >yeah but if we both pick the same plan, we would get the average of the same thing, that is 
the plans that we’ve chosen  
-B: >the highest average is 5  
-A: >if we both pick 6, we’ll get the outcome from 6  
-A: >if we pick plan 5, it’s rough on C, don’t you agree?  
-B: >I don’t know what to do                                                                          [Continued Overleaf] 
3 
[Plans 6,6] 
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-A: >I would go for 6, or 5 in the limit  
-B: >We would both be tempted by plan 0 but well, I wouldn’t have liked to be C  
-A: >yeah I think that we shouldn’t screw C over                                          
-B: >is 6 fine  
-A: >sure, that’s a deal!   
-A: >i pick 6  
-B: >me too  
-A: >done  
HavwC, Group 6:  
-A: >what plan do you propose?  
-B: >I would choose plan 0  
-B: >what do you think about that?  
-A: >I have already chosen plan 3  
-B: >why plan 3?  
-A: >I don’t really know  
-A: >and you?  
-B: >the highest gain is from 0  
-A: >maybe it’s a trick  
-A: >but go for it  
-A: >me I already validated it  
-A: >I’m waiting for your decision  
-A: >watch out for the time  
0.75 
[Plans 3,0] 
HavwC, Group 7:  
-B: >Do you know which to choose?            
-A: >in fact i have already chosen i thought you didn’t want to communicate  
-A: >i already chose plan 4  
-B: >ah and which one did you pick    
-A: >now it depends on whether you want to make money  
-B: >3 3 and -1.2  
-B: >is that it?  
-A: >yes  
-A: >I find this rather honest  
-A: >what do you think about it?  
-B: >yeah it’s clear it’s bad for C  
-A: >and you which proposition would you see?  
-B: >2.5 2.5 and 0  
-A: >me i’m not for giving money to B  
-B: >I think i’ll pick plan 4 too  
-A: >oops I meant… to C! lol  
-B: >lol 
-A: >go ahead  
-B: >you don’t want to give to C?  
-A: >well no, it’s up to us to take a decision  
-A: >ok you’ve seen there isn’t much time left  
-B: >i pick plan 2  
-B: >ok?                                                                                                           
-A: >ok 
-A: >I accepted  
1.5 
[Plans 4,2] 
HavwC, Group 8:  
-B: >what choice are you think of?  
-A: >plans 7, 8, 9 and 10 are useless : C doesn’t win more and we lose….  
-A: >either we do our all to win a max of money for US and we don’t care about C  
-B: >yes that would be a pity, i’m leaning towards the 0  
-B: >i chose this  
-A: >it’s in this case where we earn a max, but C gets done over ….  
-B: >that’s the game!                                                                                       [Continued Overleaf] 
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
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-A: >I’m thinking of 0 too…. There will be other experiments in which he won’t be C  
-B: >that’s the right choice ;)  
-A: >clearly ! i’m for for money, even if it’s not much ;)  
HavwC, Group 9:   
-B: >which do you propose?  
-A: >7 
-B: >me i was thinking of plans 5 or 6  
-B: >so?  
-A: > you are right 6 is better for us three  
-B: >or the 5.  
-B: > because the 5 doesn’t lose anything  
-A: >no because C doesn’t win anything  
-B: >but doesn’t win anything      
-A: >let’s be collective  
-B: >except for the 7 euros  
-A: >So what’s your choice?  
-B: >5 or 6  
-A: >i prefer 6 to best equilibrate the gains of the three participants  
-B: >ok  
-B: >for the 6 then  
-A: >so we validate 
-B: >GO 
3 
[Plans 6,6] 
HavwC, Group 10:  
-A: >plan 0? 
-B: >lol 
-B: >that would be mean for C^^  
-A: > you 5 me 6  
-B: >wait I’m calculating  
-B: >which plan do you pick?  
-A: >6                                                                                                       
-B: >that’s not the most efficient  
-B: >ah yes  
-A: >so what do you propose  
-B: >the 6 is the most efficient  
-B: >and shares the gains better  
-A: >then if we share, let’s pick that one   
-B: >or the 5…  
-A: >choose the 5 and i pick the 6  
-B: >either we ensure a fair distribution of resources or personal well-being ^^  
-B: >ok 
-B: >i pick 5  
-A: >ok 
-A: >i chose your turn…  
2.75 
[Plans 6,5] 
HavwC, Group 11:  
-A: >we don’t care a darn if C loses money ok?   
-A: >i choose plan 0  
-A: >and you?  
-B: >yes .. fine  
-A: >12 euros is not that bad  
-A: >so i accepted and validated  
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
HavwC, Group 12:  
-A: >hi!  
-B: >i propose plan 1  
-B: >we both win 4.5  
-A: >why not 0  
-B: >what do you think about that ????????                                                   [Continued Overleaf] 
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
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-B: >i didn’t see the 0  
-B: >not bad  
-A: >so 0 then?  
-B: >we pick 0  
-A: >ok! 
-B: >in any case c he has no chance  
-A: >that’s clear  
-B: >don’t you think that there is a trick  
-A: >yes there is a trick  
-A: >why is it the average!  
-B: >yes it’s true but it seemed too simple to me  
-B: >but i thus validate the 0  
-B: >did you validate???  
-A: >yes!  
-B: >me too  
-B: >i wouldn’t want to be C  
-A: >why?  
-B: >C has no decision to take  
-B: >and he depends on us  
-A: >yeah but he answers questions  
-A: >it’s weird  
-B: >yeah  
HavwC, Group 13:  
-A: >hello, i propose plan 5              
-B: >What do you propose?  
-A: >or plan 0 but then C won’t get anything and you?                            
-B: >i don’t know, i hesitate  
-B: >still i came to win some money  
-A: >me too  
-B: >and we don’t know C  
-A: >yes but he also came to earn money  
-B: >and then to give myself a good conscience i tell myself that if it happened C would pick 
little  
-B: >maybe plan 0 too  
-B: >frankly it’s a really difficult question  
-B: >we are asked to choose between cupidity and humanity  
-A: >ah yes  
-B: >what tempts you most?  
-A: >plan 0  
-B: >ok for me too  
-B: >we pick it?  
-A: >ok i validate  
-B: >ditto  
-B: >it’s done  
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
HavwC, Group 14:  
-A: >hello                         
-B: >i think that it would be nice for all three of us to choose this plan if you’re ok?  
-B: >( hello )  
-B: > :) 
-A: >:) 
-A: >which plan are you talking about?  
-B: >plan 6  
-B: >sorry  
-B: >it’s still the one that causes less damage, no????  
-A: >plan 5 doesn’t cause any either  
-B: >well it’s bad for C                                                                                   [Continued Overleaf] 
2.75 
[Plans 5,6] 
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-A: >he doesn’t lose anything  
-A: >should take a look  
-B: >errm… yes but we don’t earn much either  
-A: >if we chose different plans  
-A: >the average could be more interesting  
-B: >no I think we need to agree…  
-A: >no  
-B: >nyeah  
-B: >ok  
-A: >if we don’t agree it’s the average  
-B: >i choose 6 and you 5 ???   
-B: >are you ok ????   
-B: > yeah  
-A: >in any case, one of us absolutely must choose plan 6  
-B: > yes i choose 6 i find that fair  
-B: >ok ???  
-A: >wait i’m looking at what’s best  
-A: >we still have time  
-B: >i choose 6 :) i think it’s clear…. It’s the most egalitarian one   
-A: >ok choose 6                                                                     
-B: >how about you ???  
-A: >lol i continue searching  
-B: > you know he can refuse it and if so we are screwed  
-A: >no C cannot refuse  
-B: > i think that we shouldn’t be too mean …. it can fire back…. on us :)   
-B: >ooops :) yes  
-A: >choose 6  
-B: >and you?  
-A: >i take the risks :)  
-B: > meaning ???  
-A: >if it fires back it will on me  
-B: >possibly yes!  
-A: >ok i choose 5  
-B: >play it with a bit of modesty  
-B: > ok! :) 
-A: >the difference isn’t worth it  
-B: >yep 
-A: >we validate  
HavwC, Group 15:  
-A: >i propose to choose plan 0, what do you think?  
-B: >i choose plan 4 and you 6 so that C doesn’t lose, is that ok with you?   
-B: >what have you decided?  
-A: >i haven’t yet validated my decision  
-A: >we should pick decision 0  
-B: >Well OK for decision 0 (too bad for C)  
-A: >we validate 0, ok?  
-B: >ok !! 
-A: >done  
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
HavwC, Group 16:  
-A: >allo        
-B: >yes  
-B: >i think i’ve made my choice  
-A: >and which one is it?  
-B: >plan 4  
-B: >and you?  
-A: >me, I pick 1                                                                                             [Continued Overleaf] 
0.25 
[Plans 1,0] 
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-B: >ok otherwise i pick the 3  
-A: >or the 0  
-B: >so as to get a round number  
-B: >ok for the 0  
-A: >ok 
-B: >i validate  
-A: >ok 
HavwC, Group 17:  
-A: >hello                               
-B: >hello  
-A: >which one do you prefer?  
-A: >personally i’m here for the money so ….  
-B: >i think that in any case, we don’t quit  
-B: >me too  
-A: >so then we pick plan 0                                                                      
-B: >i think it’s the best to do… sorry for c  
-A: >yes                                                                                                     
-A: >after all that’s the game  
-B: >i wonder who will pick plan 10…  
-A: >whoa nobody in my opinion  
-B: >well there’s only 8 minutes left to wait ^^  
-A: >that’s a lot nonetheless 10 minutes for this  
-B: >yes  
-A: >before, i was hoping not to fall into being a C, we’ve been lucky  
-B: >yes, fortunately it’s anonymous ^^  
-A: >that’s for sure  
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
 
 
HavwC, Group 18:  
-A: >which plan shall we choose           
-B: >let’s first do some calculations  
-A: >plan 6  
-A: >i already picked  
-A: >i validate the 6  
-B: >wait just a sec  
-A: >Ok 
-A: >it’s either plan 1  
-A: >or it’s 0  
-A: >or it’s 6  
-A: >but i think that C is going to choose 6 because he also looks at our gain  
-B: >you are right  
-A: >and if one calculates in terms of averages  
-A: >if you pick something else and me another… we can then take the average  
-A: >what do you propose? then?  
-B: >for 5 for example  
-A: >we are going to do 5 then  
-A: >Ok 
-B: >now?  
-A: >confirm if it’s ok  
-B: >ok with me and you?  
-A: >it’s fine  
-B: >so we validate  
-A: > yes  
2.5 
[Plans 5,5] 
HavwC, Group 19:  
-A: >i propose we pick plan 1       
-B: >Quitting is disadvantageous for everybody, it’s best avoided in the interest of us all, 
including C  
-B: >I’m checking                                                                                           [Continued Overleaf] 
0 
[Plans 0,0] 
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-B: >It’s the best for both of us  
-A: >or radically plan 0 but C will be disadvantaged  
-A: >For both of us 0 is the best  
-B: >Plan 7 being the most equitable. 
-B: >yes  
-A: >well what do we pick then?  
-B: >with the 0, C earns one euro  
-A: >me i say that we pick 0  
-A: >i propose  
-B: >I agree.  
-A: >ok  
HavwC, Group 20:  
-B: >what do you want to choose?  
-A: >i was thinking about plan 6 or 7 and you?  
-B: >i think we agree about eliminating the propositions « Quit » and plan number 10  
-A: >right  
-B: >i would rather go for the first ones!  
-B: >the 4?  
-A: >yes that would be fine with me  
-B: >no?  
-B: >ok 
-B: >I validated  
2 
[Plans 4,4] 
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Appendix E.3: Literal transcripts of Chat log files in VwC 
Group id and chat data 
Foregone 
Payoff 
[Plan #] 
VwC, Group 1:  
-B: >hello good luck with taking your decision... 
-A: >thank you 
-A: >two secs, i’m hesitating 
-B: >sure, i would also hesitate if i were in your place 
-B: >take your time 
0.5 
[Plan 1] 
VwC, Group 2:  
-B: >hello 
-A: >hello 
-A: >I haven’t finished analysing the different gains 
-B: >take your time. 
-A: >thanks 
-A: >so, we both have the same gain, it can go from 0 to 5 
-B: >that’s correct 
-B: >what do you choose? 
-A: >the more we win the less C wins 
-A: >do you mind if C has a negative gain? 
-B: >in general, i prefer equity! 
-A: >i share your point of view 
-A: >so, our gains range from 0 to 2.5 
-B: >yes 
-B: >the game wants us to give him the maximum gain while trying to maximise our gains too 
-A: >it’s not the game that wants us to give the maximum gain 
-A: >we could very well be completely selfish 
-B: >yes we could 
-B: >but i’m not in favour of this choice 
-A: >fine 
-B: >then you choose first 
-B: >"with peace in your mind"! 
-A: >would plan 5 be fine with you, given that it’s a dry run for C                
-B: >i have mixed feelings 
-A: >what would you like for C? 
-B: >it’s the best solution for us but C finds himself at the same point as before the experiment 
-B: >i think that with more or less 50 cents, we could consider a positive gain for C 
-B: >by choosing plan 6 
-A: >"the best solution for us" is not plan 6 but plan 0 
-B: >of course, but that’s not fair. 
-A: >absolutely, but it’s only an experiment .... 
-B: >we were given these roles at random, we could have been C! 
-A: >absolutely, i wonder what this player is doing right now... 
-B: >wonder if we are going to be selfish or if we are going to thinking about him, may be! 
-A: >would you be ready to refuse a gain greater than 2, by concern for equity? 
-B: >yes 
-A: >bravo 
-B: >and you? 
-A: >if i were in your place ??? 
-B: >yes 
-A: >yes, i think, i wouldn’t like to be C 
-B: >i agree! 
-A: >so i suggest plan 6                                                                  [Continued Overleaf] 
3 
[Plan 6] 
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-B: >i agree for plan 6 
-A: >no regret ???? plan 6 and no other                                                                      
-B: >no, no regret. 
-A: >very good, so, MAKE ROOM FOR PLAN 6 !!!! 
-B: >ok 
-A: >you don’t have anything more to add                                               
VwC, Group 3:  
-A: >player B i suggest plan 6 
-A: >or do you prefer something else???? 
-B: >all three winners, ok! 
3 
[Plan 6] 
VwC, Group 4:  
-B: >suggest 0 
-A: >yep, it’s a good idea 
0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 5:  
-B: >which strategy are you going to choose? 
-A: >plan 5, no? 
-B: >poor player C :) i thought that plan 6 was a good compromise, 
-B: >it yields positive gains to us all 
-A: >Right I can hardly imagine myself shrinking C’s gains to 1euro... 
-B: >yes, that wouldn’t be very « fair play »! 
-A: >so do we choose 6?? 
-B: >you are the decision maker, but i think it’s the best. 
-B: >however, i don’t know how many times we are playing, 
-A: >ok for 6... 
3 
[Plan 6] 
VwC, Group 6 (no communication) 0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 7:  
-A: >hello. I suggest plan 0, which seems to our advantage, although C will be penalised 
-B: >OK 
-A: >gone 
0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 8:  
-B: >so ? 
5 
[Plan 0; 
B Quits] 
VwC, Group 9:  
-A: >hi 
-B: >hello 
-A: >what do you think about the plans 
-B: >i wouldn’t like to have to choose 
-A: >it’s a bit unfair if we want to get rich, no? 
-B: >it’s all a question of solidarity 
-A: >yes, i agree 
-A: >yes 
-B: >yes 
-B: >it’s also the game 
-B: >i don’t know, the more we win and the more C loses 
-A: >perhaps i should choose the optimal choice 
-A: >and then we divide 
-B: >optimal for whom? 
-A: >do you agree? 
-A: >for everybody 
-B: >for us the optimal choice is plan 0 
-B: >the + equitable is plan 7 or 8 
-A: >yes 
-B: >but at the same time, the total gain is inferior to that of plan 0 for example                                                                                                                   
.                                                                                                                                                        [Continued Overleaf] 
3 
[Plan 6] 
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-A: >but with 5 we have a total gain of 5 
-B: >no, i haven’t taken into account C’s losses                       
-A: >with 6 5 
-B: >yes 
-A: >5,2 indeed                                                                                                     
-A: >i think that it’s the best plan 
-B: >the global optimum is the 5 i think 
-A: >6 
-B: >then it depends if you want solidarity or if you are selfish 
-B: >yes 6 
-A: >yes, of course                                                                                           
-A: >6 gives 5,2 
-B: >yes 
-A: >do you agree if i choose it 
-A: >or 0 if we want to be selfish 
-B: >you are the decision maker. In any case it’s in my interest to always validate your choice, 
-B: >it will always yield more than if i quit  
-A: >that’s for sure 
-B: >(or the same) 
-A: >so I choose 6 
-B: >ok 
VwC, Group 10 (no communication) 5 
[Plan 0;  
B Quits] 
VwC, Group 11:  
-B: >hello! 
-A: >plan 0 yields more 
-A: >bye 
0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 12:  
-A: >which plan do you suggest, i think that 4 would be ok 
-B: >why 4? I would choose 0 because it would yield 5 euros. 
-B: >it doesn’t matter if C gets only 1 euro! 
-A: >it’s true that i haven’t thought that way 
-B: >so what do you choose? 
-A: >thus we choose 0 
-B: >OK ! 
0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 13 (no communication) 3 
[Plan 6] 
VwC, Group 14:  
-A: > an idea? 
-B: >errm not really 
-B: >but it would be good to try a number 
-A: >if i choose 0, that’s ok with you? 
-B: >yes 
-A: >ok 
0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 15 (no communication) 1.5 
[Plan 3] 
VwC, Group 16 (no communication) 2.5 
[Plan 5] 
VwC, Group 17:  
-B: >which plan?  
-A: >errm i’m tempted by plan 0..  
-B: >ok 
-B: >you’re the one who proposes  
0 
[Plan 0] 
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VwC, Group 18 (no communication) 0 
[Plan 0] 
VwC, Group 19:  
-B: >choose 0, it’s the best i think  
-A: >yes it’s interesting, i still think a bit  
-B: >all right  
-A: >is there another plan that you prefer?  
-B: >no  
-B: >the 0 maximizes our profits  
-A: >the 5 prevents losses to C  
-A: >it’s tough  
-B: >yes i know but it’s the game  
-A: >... 
-B: >even if that’s not nice for C  
-A: >he would leave with €1                                                                           
-B: >i know but we would leave with €12…  
-B: >i know that it’s no luck to be C, but it’s the game 
-A: >it’s true  
-A: >if you were A you’d have chosen 0 for sure  
-B: >yes i think so, even if i think it’s cruel for C  
-B: >We had one chance out of 3 to be C, we’ve been lucky not to be it so let’s take advantage 
of this  
-B: >it’s a game of luck  
-A: >i don’t want plan 0 so much anymore  
-B: >so pick plan 1  
-B: >why don’t you want plan 0?  
-A: >he’d leave with €1  
-B: >yes i know, but what can you do…. someone must lose   
-A: >not necessarily  
-A: >i like plan 5 more  
-B: >in any case C can’t hope to get high gains, so why not go with plan 0   
-A: >he didn’t come for nothing. put yourself in his shoes   
-B: >i know, if i were C i would say it’s not nice but i would understand that the two   
-B: >others  
-B: >want to maximize their profits  
2.5 
[Plan 5] 
VwC, Group 20 (no communication) 0 
[Plan 0] 
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Appendix F.1: Analysis of chat data  
 
We first categorize discussions into three types: a discussion is group-regarding (GR) if insiders 
make arguments or comments in favor of a group-centered approach (e.g., “Let’s ignore the third 
party”); a discussion is other-regarding (OR) if insiders make arguments or comments in favor 
of an approach that considers the outsider’s payoff (e.g., “Let’s maximize social welfare”); a 
discussion is neutral (N) if neither argument is discernible (i.e., it contains a mix of group- and 
other-regarding arguments) or if both arguments are raised (i.e., one insider favors group-egoism 
while the other favors altruism).5
Then, to study the extent of bonding between insiders, we classify a discussion as bonding if the 
two insiders’ use of the first-person plural (we/us) indicates a mutual identification between them 
to the exclusion of the outsider. (We ignore subtler indicators, since necessarily more 
subjective.) To achieve this classification, we proceed in two steps. First, we classify individual 
chat messages that use the term “we” or “us” as ‘us2’ or ‘us3’: a chat message is ‘us2’ if the 
insider uses “we” or “us” to refer to the two insiders (“us two”); a chat message is ‘us3’ if such a 
usage refers to both insiders and the outsider, i.e., to all three players in the game (“us three”). 
Second, we classify the chat as bonding if it contains no ‘us3’ messages and either both insiders 
send an ‘us2’ message or one insider sends an ‘us2’ and the other responds affirmatively (which 
we take as implicit confirmation of the identification); otherwise, we classify as no-bonding.
  
6
These coarse proxies for group-centrism and bonding give the classifications reported in Table 
A, on which we conduct Fisher 2×2 exact tests based on: (i) the number of groups with bonding 
instead of no bonding in HcowC, HavwC and VwC (9 out of 16, 11 out of 19 and 2 out of 13, 
respectively); (ii) the number of groups with group-regarding instead of other-regarding or 
neutral discussions among the bonding and no bonding groups of HcowC (7 of 9 and 2 of 7, 
respectively),  of HavwC (6 of 11 and 1 of 8, respectively) and of VwC (2 of 2 and 2 of 11, 
respectively); (iii) the number of groups that generate profit-maximizing instead of non-profit-
maximizing outcomes among the bonding and no bonding groups of HcowC (8 of 9 and 2 of 7, 
 
                                                 
5 We do not distinguish between egocentrism and group-centrism, because the material payoff concerns of both 
individuals inside a group are identical. 
6 In this classification, we essentially let an ‘us3’ message dominate ‘us2’ messages. We do this because the fact that 
the two insiders are the only two chatting creates a bias towards ‘us2’ usages. Also, we require both parties to 
identify as ‘us2’, since bonding is a two-sided affair. 
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respectively), of HavwC (8 of 11 and 1 of 8, respectively) and of VwC (2 of 2 and 4 of 11, 
respectively). The test outcomes are reported in the text just after Observation 3.7
Excluding neutral discussions, we also find that group-regarding discussions are relatively more 
frequent in HcowC than VwC, but the difference fails to be significant (p = .849, one-tailed 2×2 
Fisher exact test; p = .630 for HavwC vs. VwC).
 
8
 
 
Table I: Bonding and group/other-regarding discussions 
   Group- 
Regarding  
(GR) 
Other- 
Regarding  
(OR) 
Neutral 
(N) 
HcowC Bonding  1(0); 4(0); 9(0); 11(0); 
16(0); 19(0); 20(0) 
17(3) 3(0) 
 No bonding  5(0); 12(0) 6(1); 10(2.5); 
14(1.5) 
7(1); 15(1.5) 
 
 No comm.  2(0); 8(0.5); 13(0); 18(0) 
HavwC Bonding  1(0); 2(0); 8(0); 
11(0); 12(0); 17(0) 
5(3); 18(2.5)   13(0); 15(0);  
20 (2) 
 No bonding  6(0.75) 4(2.5); 9(3); 
10(2.75); 14(2.75) 
7(1.5); 16(0.25); 19(0) 
 No comm.  3(0) 
VwC Bonding  7(0); 12(0) 
 
  
 No bonding  11(0); 17(0) 3(3); 5(3); 9(3) 1(0.5); 2(3); 4(0); 
8(Q); 14(0); 19(2.5) 
 No comm.  6(0); 10(Q); 13(3); 15(1.5); 16(2.5); 18(0); 20(0) 
Note: Cells state group identity; Foregone payoff of implemented decision in parenthesis; Q = Quit; comm. = 
communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Arguably, one could categorize non-communication as no bonding for (i) and (iii), and as no bonding and neutral 
for (ii); the results are then even more significant for (i) and (ii) and they remain significant at the 10% significance 
level for (iii). 
8 We tried several other more refined codings of subjects’ conversation files to identify differences across 
organizational structures but we only report those that revealed significant differences. 
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Appendix F.2: Analysis of time differences  
 
Organizational structure and communication affect how long it takes to implement a plan.9
 
 
Reaching a consensus takes time and our data confirm that, absent communication, horizontal 
structures take significantly longer to implement a plan than do vertical ones (p = .0014 for Hco 
versus V and p = .0000 for Hav versus V, one-tailed randomization tests). Further, horizontal 
structures with averaged payoffs, Hav, take significantly longer than Hco (p = .0270, one-tailed) 
(perhaps because the consensual structure reduces independent-mindedness). Communication 
also takes time: adding the communication option significantly increases total time in vertical 
structures (p = .0009, one-tailed) and in Hav (p = .0000, one-tailed) but not in Hco (p = .3781, 
one-tailed) where conversations appear to substitute for rounds of silent proposals. Indeed, the 
time-advantage of vertical over horizontal structures disappears when communication is allowed 
(p = .8938  for VwC versus HcowC, one-tailed), though HcowC remains faster than HavwC (p = 
.0000, one-tailed). 
Table II : Average time to reach decision 
  Hco Hav V  HcowC HavwC VwC 
Total time  3’27” 
(2’44”) 
4’16” 
(1’58”) 
1’29” 
(1’21”) 
 3’03” 
(2’21”) 
7’10” 
(2’08”) 
4’35” 
(4’19”) 
Note: Time in minutes and seconds (with standard deviations). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Formally, in horizontal treatments Hco and HcowC, each game consists of N  rounds where N  depends on when 
consensus is reached (if at all); if in each round n , A and B make proposals nAy  and 
n
By  after a delay of 
n
At  and 
n
Bt , 
the round-n delay is =Max{ , }n n nA Bt t t ; if the game ends in an agreement in round N , i.e., 
n n
A By y≠  for all 
n N<  and N NA By y= , the total time delay is 
1
N
n
n
t t
=
= ∑ . 
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Appendix G.1: Cross-treatment resistance differences 
 
We also test for cross-treatment differences in resistance. The average resistance of the kind 
proposers is equal to 0.251 (s.d. 0.29) in Hco and to 0.411 (s.d. 0.47) in HcowC. The greater 
resistance of kind proposers in HcowC relative to Hco is consistent with a strong in-group bias in 
HcowC, but the difference is insignificant (p = 0.150, one-tailed randomization test).  
 
Appendix G.2: First proposals with(out) prior communication  
 
We compare the resistance indices of kind and unkind participants in groups where no chat took 
place before the first proposals were submitted, with those of participants in groups were A and 
B did communicate before submitting their first proposals. First, a comparison of the indices of 
kind participants reveals no significant difference between groups where no chat took place 
before their first round of proposals and groups where a chat took place before their first round 
of proposals (p = 0.7400, two-tailed). Second, we reach the same conclusion when looking for a 
significant difference between kind and unkind participants in groups with and without chats 
before submitting their first proposals (p-values > 0.557, two-tailed). Table C also reports the 
actual foregone payoff and the average of the first proposals of each group, but we did not find a 
significant difference between groups with and without  chats before submitting their first round 
of proposals (p-values > .7400, two-tailed) [p = 1.0 for actual foregone payoffs, p♣ = .820 and p♠ 
= .740 for average 1st proposal foregone payoffs with/without starred groups, all two-tailed].  
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Table III: Effect of communication on first proposals and resistance in HcowC  
No chat before submitting 1st proposals  Chat before submitting 1st proposals 
Group 
id 
Foregone 
payoff 
Average 
foregone 
payoff of 
1st 
proposals 
Resistance 
index 
 Group id 
Foregone 
payoff 
Average 
foregone 
payoff of 
1st 
proposals 
Resistance 
index 
kind unkind kind unkind 
1 0 0.5 0 1  3 0 1.5 0 1 
2* 0 0 n.a. n.a.  4 0 0.25 0 1 
6 1 1.25 0.333 0.667  5* 0 0 n.a. n.a. 
8 0.5 0.25 1 0  7 1 0.75 1 0 
9* 0 0 n.a. n.a.  11 0 0.75 0 1 
10 2.5 1.75 1 0  12 0 0.25 0 1 
13° 0 0.75 n.a. n.a.  15 1.5 1 1 0 
14 1.5 1.25 0.6 0.4  16* 0 0 n.a. n.a. 
18* 0 0 n.a. n.a.  17* 3 3 n.a. n.a. 
19 0 0.25 0 1  20* 0 0 n.a. n.a. 
Average 0.550 0.857
♣ 
0.600♠ 0.489 0.511  Average 0.550 
0.750♣ 
0.750♠ 0.333 0.667 
Note: n.a.: not applicable; a star (*) indicates groups with only one round of proposals; a circle (°) indicates groups 
in which the consensus (last) proposal fails to lie between the initial proposals; in either case, resistance cannot be 
assessed; ♣: without starred groups; ♠: for all groups. 
 
 
